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Abstract 
The issue of timing and scope of policies to manage invasive species has achieved considerable 
attention in the economic literature. Whereas many earlier studies compare prevention and 
control for a single invading species, we focus instead on the optimal balance of adaptation and 
control when an invasive species competes for scarce resources with a resident species. In 
particular, we focus on the role that species’ life history, i.e. the degree of evolutionary 
specialization in survival or reproduction, plays for the choice of strategy. A numerical age-
structured optimization model is used for the analysis. Results show that life history is an 
important factor for the trade-off between direct control of the invader and adaptation of 
harvesting strategies for the resident species. Life history is also crucial for the trade-off between 
early and delayed control of the invader. When a direct control technology is not available, there 
are larger economic losses with a resident species specialized in survival, whereas if such 
technologies are available, the larger losses occur with a resident species specialized in 
reproduction.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Invasive species, i.e. species that are introduced into a natural environment where they are not 
normally found, can give rise to large economic damage due to their impact on native species, 
wildlife habitats, forest and agriculture productivity, and recreation (Pimentel et al., 2005; Gren 
et al., 2009). Estimates of damage cost indicate that they can correspond 5-10% of GDP (Gren et 
al., 2009). In principle, there are three ways of controlling damage of invasive species; 
prevention, control and adaptation measures. Prevention efforts inhibit the entrance of species 
into new regions, control measures regulate the size and spread of the invader, and adaptation 
measures affect the damage caused by the invader through adjustments of economic activities at 
the site such as, e.g., the management of native species already present in the habitat (see e.g. 
Perrings 2005 and Finnoff et al., 2005 for definitions of the different types of measures). Existing 
international instruments for biodiversity conservation are mainly focused on prevention of 
unwanted introductions, while providing little guidance regarding the issue of control or 
adaptation (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2001). However, these 
prevention measures sometimes fail to stop the entrance of invasive species, and the associated 
establishment and growth are determined by the interaction with resident species. The 
implication of this interaction for optimal choice of control and adaptions strategies has, to the 
best of our knowledge, not been analyzed in the economic literature (see Gren 2008 for a 
review). The purpose of this paper is to examine how optimal control and adaptation policies 
depend on the economic and biological characteristics of invading and resident species. To this 
end, we use a two-population discrete dynamic model with an invasive species, which compete 
for scarce resources with a commercially valuable harvested resident species 
 
A vast majority of the economic studies on invasive species focus on the trade-off between 
prevention and control measures, and abstract from the interaction with the resident species. 
Because of the stochastic impact of prevention measures on the invader, the impact of prevention 
is typically modeled as random, while control is assumed to exert a known impact on the invader 
population (Olson and Roy, 2005; Kim et al., 2006; Leung et al., 2002; Finnoff et  
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al., 2007). Within this type of framework, Olson and Roy (2005) use a static stochastic model to 
examine how the trade-off between prevention and control depends on the economic and 
biological characteristics of a single invader, such as initial invasion size, invader growth rate, 
and the probability distribution of introductions. Kim et al. (2006) assume that discovery of the 
invader occurs with a delay, and show that it is economically efficient to spend more on 
prevention before than after the discovery of the invader. After discovery, prevention can still be 
more important than control if the invader population is small enough, but when the population 
increases, prevention is no longer optimal. Total expenditures on prevention and control are 
shown to decrease with the population of the invader, and increase with the invader population 
growth rate and the carrying capacity of the invaded ecosystem.  
 
The consideration of uncertainty in invader growth, in particular when entering a new ecosystem, 
is recognized by Leung et al. (2002). They use stochastic dynamic programming model to 
identify the optimal combination of prevention and control, and derive associated acceptable 
invasion risk. Finnoff et al. (2007) argue that national and regional managers frequently 
implement policies when invaders have arrived and show that this can be explained by risk 
aversion if the effect of control on invader population is certain whereas the effect of prevention 
is not. The importance of recognizing uncertainty in the spread of an introduced invader is 
supported by ecological literature, where it is argued that the efficacy of control is dependent on 
the progress stage of the invasion (e.g. Grice, 2009). It is, e.g., suggested that control strategies 
should exploit times when the invasive species population is low. It is also emphasized that 
ability of the invasive species to compete with resident species and survive in the new habitat is 
increasingly more important compared to biological dispersal ability (MacArthur and Wilson, 
1967). Therefore, the focus in this article is on the role that life history of invasive and 
commercial resident species plays for the economic damage of invasions actually occurring, 
while we abstract from the role that life history can have for species’ dispersal. Developing a 
bio-economic model, we analyze how the trade-off between control and adaptation depends on 
invasive and resident species life history and on technologies for control and adaptation. In our  
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view, this paper contributes to the literature on control and adaptation through i) the inclusion of 
a interaction between invading and resident species, ii) the use of an age-structured model, which 
allows for analysis of the role of the age of the invader at the time of arrival as well the role of 
age for the optimal control and harvesting decisions, and iii) modeling of alternative species 
types that differ only in terms of life history, which allows for the analysis of life history for the 
above trade-off.  
 
The main results of this paper show that life history is an important factor for the trade-off 
between direct control of the invader and adaptation of harvesting strategies for the resident 
species. Life history is also crucial for the trade-off between early and delayed control of the 
invader. When a direct control technology is not available there are larger economic losses with a 
resident species specialized in survival, whereas if such technologies are available, the larger 
losses occur with a resident species specialized in reproduction. 
 
The paper is organized as follows; the bio-economic model is presented in Section 2, and data 
for the empirical are given in Section 3. Next, the results are presented and the paper ends with a 
brief summary and discussion in Section 5. 
 
 
 
2. Bio-economic model 
 
The bio-economic model builds on Elofsson et al., (2012) and adds the possibility of adaptation 
measures. In order to analyze the role of invading and resident species life history, we then 
classify species into two types, A and B, corresponding to iteroparous species of type I and III, 
respectively. The classification is based on the observation that species have a limited amount of  
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energy available, which must be allocated between fecundity and survival, thereby defining their 
life history strategy. The type A life history is found among species that spend large efforts to 
protect to their relatively few offspring, thereby increasing the probability of survival of the 
young, such as e.g. mammals (Deevey, 1947; Polis and Farley, 1980). The type B life history is 
found among species that produce high numbers of young at a cost of low juvenile survival. This 
type of life history is common among e.g. fish, insects, marine invertebrates, and plants. The two 
species types have the following characteristics (cf. Lack 1954; Williams, 1966; Pianka and 
Parker, 1975):  
 
- Type A species has, as a juvenile, a high survival rate which falls as age increases. 
Reproduction is low for all mature age classes.  
-  Type B, juvenile survival is low but the survival rate increases with age. Reproduction is 
high for reproductive age classes and increases with age.  
 
Following Elofsson et al. (2012) we assume there are two species populations, one resident and 
one invader, each associated with a life history j, with j=A,B. A stock transition relationship 
describes the development of the populations over time. The fraction of individuals of cohort a 
surviving until the following year is denoted 1,a jα + . The number of individuals of the two 
species in a habitat is assumed to affect survival and offspring production due to competition for 
limiting resources. Survival and offspring production of the species from one year to another is 
therefore assumed to be determined by a factor 
( )aj aj aj ajt t
a
R I
e
β µ− +∑
, which is decreasing in the 
number of residents and invaders. The coefficients ajβ  and ajµ  indicate, respectively, the 
carrying capacity of the habitat with regard to the species own population, and the degree of 
competition for scarce resources such as food or space between the two species. 
 
The number of individuals in cohort a+1 of the resident species, 1,1
a j
tR
+
+ , counted before the 
reproductive season, is defined by: 
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1
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0   and
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aj
t
aj
t
aj aj
R R e H j A B a a
H a h
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R R
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− +
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∑
= ∀ = ∀ =
= ∀ <
≥ ∀ ≤ ≤
=
   (1)  
 
where ajtR  and 
aj
tI  denote the number of individuals of resident and invader species, 
respectively, belonging to cohort a at time t and ajtH  is the harvest of the resident species at time 
t. It is assumed that only individuals above age h  are captured. The number of individuals in 
different cohorts of the resident species at time t=0 is given by 0
ajR . 
 
Individuals of the resident species are assumed to reach maturity at the age of a , and continue to 
reproduce until they die at an age of a . Resident species recruitment is assumed to be 
determined by:  
 
( ) ( )0 0
0 0   ,
j aj j aj aj aj aj aj
t t t t
a a
a R I R I
j aj j aj
t t
a a
R R e m e j A B
β µ β µ
α
− + − +
≥
∑ ∑ 
= ∀ = 
 
∑ ,   (2) 
 
where 
( )aj aj aj ajt t
a
N I
ajm e
β µ− +∑
 is the gross number of offspring produced and 
( )0 0
0
j aj j aj
t t
a
N I
je
β µ
α
− +∑
 is the 
survival rate in the same year, with both terms being affected by inter- and intra-species 
competition.  
 
Stock dynamics of the invading species are defined by: 
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1, 1,
1 -    , ,  and 0,1,...,
where
0  ,
0   and
aj aj aj aj
t t
a
I R
a j aj a j aj aj
t t t t
aj
t
aj
t
I I e V W j A B a a
W a g
W g a a
β µ
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− +
+ +
+
∑
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= ∀ <
≥ ∀ ≤ ≤
,  (3) 
  
where ajtV , with 0
aj
tV ≥ , is the number of individuals of cohort a of the invading species 
entering the habitat in time period t, and  ajtW  is the number of invaders subject to control in the 
same time period. It is assumed that no individual below age g  is captured.  
 
Invader recruitment is analogous to that of the resident: 
 
 
( ) ( )0 0
0 0   ,
j aj j aj aj aj aj aj
t t t t
i a
a I R I R
j aj j aj
t t
a a
I I e m e j A B
β µ β µ
α
− + − +
≥
∑ ∑ 
= ∀ = 
 
∑
 
  (4) 
 
 
It is assumed that there is a sole manager of the habitat, whose objective is to maximize the net 
present value from joint management of the two species. The manager is assumed to be a price-
taker in all markets. Revenues from harvests of the resident species, jtTR , are: 
 
j j aj aj
t t
a h
TR p w H
≥
= ∑
 
,        (5) 
 
where jp  is the price per kilo, ajw  is the age-specific weight of the resident species and ajtH  is 
the catch of cohort a. The total harvesting cost, TCR, is: 
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,
j j
j j aj aj aj aj
t t t
a h a h
TCR w R w H
γ δ
η
≥ ≥
   
=    
   
∑ ∑ ,      (6) 
 
where jγ  is the stock elasticity, jδ  the output elasticity and jη  a calibration parameter (cf. 
Danielsson et al. [1997], Sandberg [2006]). 
 
Following Olson and Roy (2005), the total cost for control of the invader is assumed to depend 
on the magnitude of control as well as on the stock of the invader, and is defined by: 
 
,
j j
j j aj aj aj aj
t t t
a h a h
TCI w I w W
θ τ
ψ
≥ ≥
   
=    
   
∑ ∑
      (7)
 
 
where jψ  and jθ  are the stock and output elasticities, and 
jτ  is a calibration parameter. 
 
Profits in a given time period, πt, are defined by: 
 
j j j
t t t tTR TCR TCIπ = − − ,        (8)  
 
and the total net present value, TNPV, is given by:  
 
1
T
t t
t
TNPV ρ π
=
=∑ ,         (9) 
 
where ρt=(1/(1+r))t is the discount factor with r as the annual discount rate. The manager of the 
two-population system is assumed to choose harvests and control in order to maximize (9) given 
(1)-(8). Setting up the Lagrangian function and solving for the Kuhn-Tucker first order  
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conditions (see Appendix), gives the following equations for the development of ajtH , 
aj
tW , 
aj
tR
and ajtI along the optimal path: 
 
 
1,
1 0,
0,  0 ,  0,1,...,  and ,...,
aj
aj
t j j a j
t t tH
t aj aj
t tH
L TR TCR
L H H t a h a
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ρ
− +
+
−
′ ′′ = − − ≤
′ = ≤ = =                
(10) 
1, 1, 0 0 1, 1, 0 0
1 1 1 1
0
0,
0,  0,  0,1,...,  and 1,..., 1
aj
t
aj
t
i
t j a j a j aj j j a j a j j j
t t t t t t t t t tR
i
t aj aj
t tR
L TCR R R I I
L R R t a a
ρ ρλ λ λ ρ ω ω
ρ
− + + + +
+ + + +
=
−
′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ = − + − + − − ≤
′ = ≥ = = −
∑
  (11) 
  
1,
1 0,
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t
aj
t
t j a j
t tW
t aj aj
t tW
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− +
+
−
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′ = ≤ = =
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1, 1, 0 0 1, 1, 0 0
1 1 1 1
0
0
0,  0,  0,1,...,  and 1,..., 1
aj
t
aj
t
a
t j a j a j j j a j a j aj j j
t t t t t t t t t tI
a
t aj aj
t tI
L TCI R R I I
L I I t i i
ρ ρ λ λ ρϖ ϖ ϖ
ρ
− + + + +
+ + + +
=
−
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∑
 (13)
 
 
Equation (10) shows that the optimal harvest of an age cohort at time t is determined by the 
marginal net benefit of harvesting in current period and the marginal user cost, 1,1
a j
tρλ
+
+ . 
 
Similarly, quation (11) shows that the resident population is determined by the marginal increase 
in harvesting cost, the discounted marginal value of the age cohort at time t+1, the marginal 
value of one individual of the cohort at time t, the marginal value of the direct and indirect 
impact on recruitment, and discounted marginal value of the impacts on survival and recruitment 
of the invader. Noting the one-to-one relationship between ajtR  and 
1,
1
a j
tH
−
− , see equation (1), the 
two last term in equation (11) indicate the additional marginal cost of harvesting at time t-1 in 
the presence of an invasion, due to the increased growth of the invader. The increased growth of 
the invader will, in turn, reduce growth of the resident population and thereby increase 
harvesting costs through the stock term in the cost function. 
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Equation (12) demonstrates that optimal control of the invader is determined by marginal control 
cost and the negative marginal user value of the invader.  Given the one-to-one relationship 
between control and invader population, equations (12) and (13) show that the marginal user cost 
of control is jointly determined by the negative increase in control cost owing to the stock effect, 
the marginal value of the positive impact on resident species survival and reproduction and the 
negative marginal value of the positive impact on invader species survival and reproduction, 
divided by the marginal survival of the invader. Therefore, control is higher if the marginal stock 
effect on control costs is low, there is high competition with the resident species and the own 
density dependence is low, where the latter occurs when the invader population is small. The 
remaining first order conditions are included in the Appendix.  
 
 
3. Data  
 
Data used for the population model are generic data from Järemo and Bengtsson (2011) which 
illustrate the typical life history of type A and B species. Both species are have a life span of six 
years, which implies that we have six age cohorts, with a=0,…,5. Survival data illustrate the 
characteristics of the different species types, described above. Hence, a type B species has a 
higher reproduction than type A, but a lower juvenile survival. Reproduction parameters are 
calibrated such that both species have the same finite rate of increase at a stable age distribution 
and density independence. In the absence of competition between species, the age of highest 
reproductive value1 is three for a type A organism and five for a type B. The age specific intra- 
and inter-species competition effects, βaj and µaj, are subjectively set to 0.00001 for all age 
classes and species. The age-specific weight is assumed to increase linearly with age and is 
normalized to 1 for 5-year olds of both species. All parameter values that characterize the life 
histories of the different species types are given in Table 1.  
                                                          
1 The age with the highest expected reproduction of an individual from their current age onward, given that they 
have survived to their current age. 
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TABLE 1. Model Data. 
 Age 
                                                 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Age specific survival (αaA), sp. Aa  0.80 0.70 0.50 0.32 0.22 0.14 
Age specific survival (αaB), sp. Ba 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 
Fecundity (maA), sp. Aa 0 0 4 4 4 5 
Fecundity (maB), sp. Ba 0 0 20 40 80 150 
Intra- and interspecies competition (βak and µak) 0.00001 
Weight at age ( ajw ), sp. A and B  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Number of individuals at t=0 ( 0
aAR ), sp. A  2239 1497 716 65 0 0 
Number of individuals at t=0 ( 0
aBR ), sp. B 2894 831 397 227 152 16 
 
 
We assign the identical economic parameters to both species types. The price of harvest, jp  in 
eq. (5) is normalized to one. Harvest and control technologies are assumed to be similar. It is 
presumed that only individuals of age 2 or older can be harvested or controlled, respectively. The 
size of stock elasticity in equations (6) and (7) depends on whether we have group-living or 
solitary species, i.e. for group-living species a stock elasticity less than minus one can generally 
be expected (Bjørndal, 1987, 1988). We assign the value -1 to jγ and jθ , thereby assuming that 
the species are relatively uniformly dispersed over the habitat. Output elasticity is determined by 
the size of scale economies in harvesting and control. Here, the output elasticities 𝜏𝑗 and 𝛿𝑗  are 
both assumed to be equal to one, implying that we have linear cost functions. Diseconomies of 
scale would be associated with an output elasticity would be larger than one, whereas under 
economies of scale it would be smaller than one. The parameters jη  and 𝜓𝑗  are arbitrarily set to 
1. The initial vector 0
ajR  is set as the steady-state stock in the economic profit-maximizing 
equilibrium with harvest in the absence of invaders and the discount rate r is set to 3 percent, as 
suggested by e.g. Boardman et al. (2011) to be in concordance with values used for cost-benefit 
analysis of public projects. 
 
In the following, optimal harvests are simulated over 50 years. Simulations show that when 
direct control is included then steady state conditions, with positive levels of harvest, control and  
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populations of both species which last over a longer time, are found for most invasions given the 
level of propagule pressure assumed here. This contrasts with the situation where harvest 
adaptation is the only available management measure, i.e. when 0ajtW = . In that case, steady 
state conditions have not been achieved in simulations. With the resident species initially at the 
economic equilibrium, steady state condition prevail, approximately, between year 15 and 35, 
thereafter the resident species is completely harvested when time approaches T.  
 
4. Results 
 
The above model describes a system with two types of decision variables, harvest of the resident 
species and direct control of the invader. Given that both resident and invasive species can have 
one out of two different life history types, there are four different possible combinations of 
resident and invading species types. Furthermore, the invasions can be made by individuals 
belonging to six different age classes. Thus, there are a large number of different possible 
invasion scenarios. Below, results are calculated for invasions of ten individuals of a given age 
and type in each time period in each scenario. The calculations are made using GAMS (Brooke 
et al. [1998]). In the following, we (i) investigate the role of direct control technologies for the 
economic vulnerability of resident species of different type, (ii) compare the scope and timing of 
control and harvest adaptation, (iii) investigate the trade-off between harvest adaptation and 
direct control, and (iv) examine the balance between early and delayed control for invaders of 
different type and age.  
  
4.1 The role of direct control possibilities for economic damages 
 
In order to investigate the economic implications of a direct control technology being available, 
we compare the TNPV for the case where (i) adaptation of harvests of the resident species is the 
only means available to manage the invader and (ii) both adaptation of harvests and direct 
control of the invader are possible. Results are shown in figure 1. The figure reveals that in the  
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absence of the direct control technology, there is larger economic damage when the invader is of 
type B or the resident is of type A, ceteris paribus. With chosen data, the possibility to control 
invaders directly will substantially improve the TNPV. Moreover, when the control option is 
included, residents of type A become economically more robust with regard to invasions 
compared to type B, while the situation is reversed when control is not included. Type B remains 
the more damaging species whether control is included or not. The large positive impact of the 
control option on a resident type A is explained by the high cost for harvest adaptation for this 
type of species when control is not possible, in combination with the small impact of harvest 
adaptation on invader population growth due to the comparatively low reproduction of the 
harvested age-classes. Thus, large adaptation costs are saved when the control option is 
available. Adding to the effect is that in equilibrium, a larger biomass is harvested for a type A, 
implying that there is a larger value to be spared when applying control.  
 
For a type B invader, the relative difference between invaders of different age with regard to the 
economic damage caused is altered when control is available. Without control, a type B age 4 is 
the most damaging, which is explained by its high remaining life-time reproduction. However, 
when direct control is possible, a type B species age 5 causes the largest economic damage. The 
explanation is that direct control is effective when directed towards 4-year olds2 given their high 
remaining life-time reproduction. Control of age-class 4 is also the optimal strategy when this is 
the age of the invader at the time of introduction. However, when the invading age-class is 5 
years old, then it is less efficient to wait until the juveniles produced reach age-class 4, given the 
relatively large growth of the invader population in the meantime. When invaders are age 5 at the 
time of introduction, only about 1/3 of the direct control is directed towards 4-years olds, while 
the rest of the control is directed towards 5-year olds. Consequently, with a 5-year old invader, 
control is less efficient. Moreover, control costs are larger than with a 4-year old invader per 
individual controlled, given the higher weight of 5-year old individuals. Together, this implies 
 
                                                          
2 Age class 4 is targeted by control when the invader is age-class 3 to 5.  
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that the control technology is more efficient when the invader is 4 years old, explaining the 
reversal of the outcome between these age-classes.  
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FIGURE 1. TNPV of harvest under different invasions. Data series display “resident species type 
- invasive species type – control option availability”. The vertical axis shows the TNPV in the 
invasion scenario divided by TNPV in the case with no invasion. The primary and secondary 
vertical axis indicates scenarios when a control technology is unavailable and available, 
respectively. 
 
4.2 Scope and timing of management  
 
The scope and timing of control differs substantially between invasion scenarios. With a type A 
invader, only age class 2 is controlled if the invader is between zero and two years old at the time 
of invasion. This is explained by the high damaging potential of age-class 2, see Figure 1, given 
that this age-class causes the most rapid growth of invader population, in combination with the 
restriction on control of age-classes below 2, and the lower cost per individual controlled for 
younger individuals due to their lower biomass. For invaders age class 0-2, control is increasing  
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over the first years, reaching a stable level after 10-15 years, cf. Figure 2. Low control in the first 
years is explained by the high control cost because of the small stock of the invader.  
 
For older age classes, control of age class 2 is combined with control of the invading age class. 
This illustrates the trade-off between immediate control of invading individuals and control 
directed towards the most damaging age-class as well as the role of control cost where, as 
mentioned above, control cost is related to weight. Total numbers controlled is increasing over 
the first years, reaching a stable level after approximately 10 years. 
 
When there is a type B invader, control efforts are directed towards age class 3 and 4 when the 
invader is of age 3 or below. When the invader is age 4, control is focused on this age class only, 
whereas if the invader is age 5, control efforts are directed towards age classes 4 and 5. A stable 
level of total control is achieved after 9-20 years, where the adjustment path increases with age. 
 
A comparison of the timing of control and harvest reveals that the presence of an invasion 
implies that harvests will, in the first few time periods, be higher than without an invasion, 
because it is anticipated that the future stock of the resident will be lower and hence harvesting 
costs higher, cf. Figure 2. In the medium term, harvests will be lower than in the no-invasion 
case.  
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FIGURE 2. Control of invader type A age 2 with a resident B, and harvest of the resident. The 
data series are indicated by “management strategy  – available management strategies”. Harvest 
in the case with no invasion is included for reference. The primary vertical axis shows the 
number of resident harvested and the secondary vertical axis the number of invaders controlled.  
 
 
If there is no possibility to exert direct control towards the invader, harvest adaptation will be 
used to “crowd-out” the invader, see Figure 2. Over the first five time period, harvests are 
reduced in order to increase the resident population. This leads to “crowding-out” of the invader 
and lower harvesting costs in the medium term. Therefore, harvests can again be increased in the 
medium term, even though they are not as high as in the no-invasion scenario. 
 
4.3 The trade-off between adaptation and control  
 
In principle, the trade-off between harvest adaptation and control is determined by (i) the 
variation in impact of control of different age classes, where larger variation between age classes 
implies that direct control is favored over adaptation, and (ii) the costs of control versus harvest  
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adaptation, where the strategy with lower cost is optimally favored over the other. With the given 
model, direct control is more efficient with an invading type B species given the larger variation 
in reproduction between age classes. As shown in Elofsson et al. (2012), adaptation is generally 
more efficient with a resident type B species due to the high reproduction of the marginally 
harvested age class 4, in combination with the modest cost for abstaining from harvesting this 
age class.  
 
Some harvest adaptation is always optimal, given the construction of the model. However, with 
equal parameters in the harvest and control cost functions such as assumed above, harvests are 
little adapted in the medium and long term if there is a possibility to directly and selectively 
control the invader. In order to investigate conditions when harvest adaptation becomes a  
significant tool to the policymaker, we examine the role of control cost function parameters for 
this choice. It seems reasonable that control costs could be higher compared to harvesting costs, 
given that the invaders behavior might not be equally well known and technologies for control 
might not be well established. This implies that the cost level jψ   and the output elasticity could 
be higher, while there are no obvious expectations to put on the stock elasticity.  
 
Results show that management strategies are insensitive to assumptions about the calibration 
parameter jψ as well as to stock elasticity in the control cost function. This confirms results in 
Elofsson et al. (2012) regarding the role of the corresponding parameters in the harvesting cost 
function. If, however, the output elasticity of the control cost function is high, implying rapidly 
increasing marginal cost of control, harvest adaptation can be included to a significant extent in 
optimum. We here chose to measure harvest adaptation through the impact on the resident 
species population. In Figure 3 below, the increase in the resident population, motivated by the 
crowding-out effect that it has on the invader, is shown when the output elasticity of the control 
cost function is three times as large as in the reference case. The figure suggests that harvest 
adaptation can be of importance in an optimal policy, in particular with a resident type B and an  
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invader type A age 2. This is also the scenario with largest economic damages, cf. Figure 1. In 
scenarios where both resident and invasive species are of type A, harvest adaptation is of little 
importance, even with a high output elasticity of control cost.  
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FIGURE 3. Harvest adaptation. Increase in resident species population after 25 years when the 
output elasticity of the control cost function equals 3. The vertical axis shows total population 
number in the relevant scenario divided by reference scenario. 
 
 
Next, the question is how harvest adaptation affects the control strategy. We look at the scenario 
with the largest harvest adaptation when 3jθ = , i.e. with a resident B and invading A age 2. 
Figure 4 shows the optimal development of the resident population and of control of the invader. 
The results illustrate that with rapidly increasing marginal costs of control, harvest are reduced 
such that the resident population increases in the medium term in order to crowd out the invader. 
The higher control costs imply that control is reduced over the first 15 years. Thereafter, control 
is larger than in the reference case for the next 25 years. The larger control is explained by 
falling control costs because of the more rapid increase in the stock of the invader over the first 
15 years, in combination with larger marginal benefit of control under a larger invader stock as  
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the marginal impact of the invader on survival and reproduction is increasing in the invader 
stock. A paradoxical consequence of the higher output elasticity is that the total number of 
individuals controlled after 35-40 years only slightly exceeds the numbers controlled in the 
reference scenario, but the invader population is more than eight times as large.  
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FIGURE 4. Harvest adaptation and control in a scenario with a type B resident and invader type 
A age 2. Comparison of reference scenario and a scenario where 3jθ = .  
 
 
4.4 Early or delayed control 
 
Next we investigate the balance between efforts to control the invader at an early stage and 
efforts to control the invader when it is already established. Control at an early stage, namely at 
the time of introduction, can be approximated by control of the invading age class3. Control 
when the invader is established can be approximated by control of all other age-classes. The cost  
 
                                                          
3 In almost all scenarios, control of the invading age class never exceeds 10 individuals, i.e. the number of 
individuals entering the ecosystem. The single exception is with an invading type B age 4, where steady state control 
is 10-12 individuals.  
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of control of a particular age class aˆ , aˆjtCI ,is calculated as the total cost of control, weighted by 
the biomass-share of that particular age class, i.e. 
( )ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ
j j
aj j aj aj aj aj aj aj aj aj
t t t t t
a h a h a a
CI w I w W w W w W
θ τ
ψ
≥ ≥ ≠
     
=      
    
∑ ∑ ∑ . The net present value of this cost 
then constitutes the aggregate cost for controlling that particular age class. 
 
The relative costs of efforts spent on early control of invading and delayed control of other age 
classes are shown in Figure 5 below. The balance between early and delayed control is 
determined by the relative costs of controlling different age classes, which is determined by age-
specific weight. Also, early control is favored if future damages or the costs of delayed control 
are large. Future damages are large if the invader population grows rapidly in number, and future 
control costs are large if the invader increases rapidly in weight with age. 
 
Early control of the invading age class is the only type of control if the invader is a type A age 2 
or a type B age 4, independently of the resident species type, see Figure 5. In both cases, these 
age-classes cause large economic damage given that invader population grows rapidly in 
numbers.  Thus, early control prevents large future damages.  
 
Relatively larger costs are optimally incurred for early control of the invading age class if the 
resident is of type A than if it is of type B. This is explained by the larger long term damage of an 
additional invader individual when there is a resident A, given the lower reproduction of type A 
and hence the slower recovery of the resident stock, once it is harmed by competition of an 
invader.  
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FIGURE 5. Optimal discounted relative costs for control of different age classes when control 
costs are determined by the biomass controlled. Results are indicated by “resident species type – 
invader species type – invader age”.  
 
 
The results in Figure 5 are calculated assuming that control costs are determined by controlled 
biomass. An alternative approach would be to assume that control costs are determined by the 
number of individuals controlled. In order to investigate whether such an assumption would have 
a significant impact on the balance between early and delayed control, we calculate control costs 
assuming that all individuals in the invader population have the same weight. This implies that 
control costs are independent of invader age, and thus only determined by the number of 
individuals. The results from these calculations are shown in Figure 6. Under such a scenario one 
would generally expect that older age classes will be controlled to a higher degree than shown in 
Figure 5, because the cost of controlling older individuals is comparatively lower. This will hold 
provided that, in the reference scenario, (i) there are older age classes which can be controlled 
and (ii) the control cost reduction is sufficient to motivate a change of strategy, given the 
difference in damage done to the resident species. This damage is determined by reproduction 
and survival of the individual controlled as well as the size of resident and invader stocks. 
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From Figure 6 one can find that with equal weight per individual, 0.5 weight units, there are, as 
can be expected, relatively more resources devoted to early control for all invading age classes 3-
5 when the resident is type A, given the relatively spoken lower cost for controlling these age 
classes, compared to the case in Figure 5. With a type A resident, there are, however, also more 
resources devoted to early control of type B invaders age 2. The invader population in present in 
the habitat has a higher biomass in the steady state4 compared to the situation depicted in Figure 
5, which makes control less costly overall, wherefore total control is larger. The higher biomass 
is explained by juveniles constituting a large share of the population and they now have a 
relatively spoken higher weight per individual. Given the increase in total control, all individuals 
age 3 are controlled and therefore, more control is directed towards invaders age 2.  
 
With a resident B and an invading A, fewer resources are devoted to early control for all invading 
age classes but age class 5, which is explained by the lower control cost for older age classes. 
With a resident B and an invading B, more resources are devoted to early control if the invader is 
age class 3 or 5, and less if it is age class 2 or 4. For invasions of age class 2 and 4, relatively 
more resources are allocated to the control of older, more damaging age classes. For invaders of 
age class 5, the age class is subject to more control as it is highly damaging. For invasions of age 
class 3, the large share of resources spent on control of the invading age class is, again, explained 
by the fact that the whole age class 4 is already subject to control. In this scenario equal weight 
implies that, compared to the reference scenario, control of the invading age class is first reduced 
in the initial time periods. The manager knows that it will now be less expensive to control age 
class 4, compared to the reference scenario depicted in Figure 5. Therefore, he or she initially 
postpones control of 3-year old individuals until they are 4 years old, thereby saving on control 
costs. Thereafter periods, control is increased above levels in the reference scenario for a number 
of time periods, because control costs are lower with equal weight as soon as there are enough  
 
                                                          
4 Given that juveniles constitute a large share of the population and now have a higher weight. 
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juveniles in the population. The invader population stabilizes at a somewhat lower level, 
compared to the reference scenario. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6. Optimal discounted relative costs for control of different age classes when control 
costs are determined by the number of individuals controlled. Results are indicated by “resident 
species type – invader species type – invader age”.  
 
 
5. Summary and discussion 
 
Using a model of optimal co-management of one resident and one invading species, we attempt 
to examine the balance between harvest adaptation and direct control. We also investigate the 
trade-off between early and delayed control of invaders once they have entered a new habitat. 
Both issues are investigated with a focus on species life history and invader age for the trade-offs 
made. Assuming similar cost functions for harvest of the resident and control of the invader, as 
well as similar functions describing the development of the two populations, allows us to isolate 
the role of life history for the choice of management strategy. 
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The analysis shows that the marginal user cost of the resident species is determined by density of 
the species, given the role that density has for harvesting cost, survival and reproduction, and by 
the development of the stock of the invasive species, given the competition between the two for 
scarce resources such as food or space. Correspondingly, the marginal user cost of the invader is  
determined by sensitivity of control cost to invader density as well as by density dependence of 
invader growth and the degree of competition between the two species.  
 
Certain species are, through evolution, specialized in survival rather than reproduction. Results 
from numerical simulations suggest that this type of species is more economically vulnerable to 
invasions if harvest adaptation is the only available management tool, compared to species which 
have specialized in reproduction. However, the situation is reversed if direct and selective 
control of the invader is possible. In that case, species specialized in reproduction rather than 
survival, become the most vulnerable type. The reversal of outcome is caused by the inefficiency 
of harvest adaptation as a tool to manage invaders when the resident species cannot, with the 
help of harvesting strategy choices, be made to rapidly change its grow rate, such as is the case 
for species specialized in survival.  
 
Results also show that although direct control is initially costly when the invader population is 
small and hence individuals are hard to find in the habitat, control rapidly increases and a steady 
state with constant control, harvest and populations appears within a limited number of years. 
This outcome differs from the case where only harvest adaptation is possible, as in that case 
steady states seem unlikely to arise. If the output elasticity of control is high enough, solutions 
which include both control and harvest adaptation can be optimal. An exception is when both 
resident and invader species are specialized in survival. In that case harvest adaptation seems 
little relevant as a tool to reduce economics damages from invasions. 
 
The choice between early control of the invader at the time of invasion and delayed control in 
later time periods is determined by differences in costs and effects of controlling different age  
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classes. Relatively larger costs are optimally devoted to early control if the resident is of type A. 
This is mainly explained by a slower recovery of the resident stock, once it is harmed by an 
invader.  
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Appendix  
 
The manager of the two-population system is assumed to choose harvests of the resident 
species and control of the invader in order to maximize (9) given (1)-(8). Let λtaj denote the 
Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (1) and (2) and ajtϖ  the Lagrange multipliers for the 
constraints (3)and (4). The Lagrangian function is then: 
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The first order conditions for this maximization problem, including the complementary slackness 
conditions, are: 
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